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In Asian economies, senior members 
of the political and government elite 
were publicly committed to and held 
accountable for industrial development 
outcomes
One way in which the flow of 
information between the public and 
private sectors can be encouraged is by 
focusing on specific constraints to firm 
performance
Africa faces a major constraint to 
experimentation with policy— the 
donors
Feedback was an essential element 
of the Asian industrial policy process 
and an important means of building 
accountability
Industrial policy has finally moved away from the arid debate on ‘picking 
winners’ versus ‘levelling the playing field’. Today, there is growing 
understanding that the market imperfections on which the theoretical 
arguments for industrial policy rest are pervasive, especially in low-income 
countries.
From theory to practice
There is less understanding, however, of how to move from theory to practice. 
For this reason, the ‘how’ of industrial policy-making is as important as the 
‘why’ and the ‘what’ but it has received far less attention. 
While there is considerable diversity, there are a number of common themes 
that characterize successful business–government coordination. Four of these 
are of particular relevance to governments attempting to improve the practice 
of industrial policy: commitment, focus, experimentation and feedback.
Commitment
In Asian economies, ranging from Japan to Vietnam, senior members of 
the political and government elite were publicly committed to and held 
accountable for industrial development outcomes. One virtue of having a 
champion is that it identifies a person who has the job of explaining the 
policy agenda and who can be held politically responsible for things going 
right or wrong. A second reason why high-level leadership is critical to the 
success of strategic coordination is the need for coherence within government 
in following up and implementing the decisions reached as a result of public–
private problem-solving. 
Where, as was often the case in Africa, public officials believed the political 
leadership lacked deep interest in industrial development outcomes, there 
was little follow up to efforts to engage the private sector. The research 
on Ghana for example suggests that although the state has expressed a 
strong rhetorical commitment to the private sector, there is not much actual 
commitment by political elites. 
Focus 
East Asian case studies suggest that one way in which the flow of information 
between the public and private sectors can be encouraged and the risk of 
capture reduced is by focusing on specific constraints to firm performance. 
This is the ‘helping hand’ aspect of industrial policy, and it is particularly 
relevant to countries at the early stages of industrial development. The key 
elements of the process are agreement between business and government 
on a specific objective, and the proposed course of action. A timetable for 
resolution of the problem is announced and progress in implementation 
monitored and reported. 
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Effective implementation of public actions derived from the 
state–business dialogue requires effective coordination in 
government. In the African case studies it often appeared 
that the right hand of government was not aware of what 
the left hand was doing. Lack of coordination, for example, 
was an important cause of the poor performance of Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) programs in Africa. A lack of alignment 
in the incentives between people promoting exports and 
those responsible for fiscal matters, such as the Ministry of 
Finance and the Customs Authority, contributed to failure 
of several zone projects. In most cases the investment 
promotion agency and the SEZ authority operated 
independently of each other with little effort to coordinate.
Experimentation 
East Asian industrial policy makers have shown a striking 
willingness to experiment. Ideas were often generated by 
observation of successful examples from elsewhere. Public 
actions were developed, and the results—measured in 
terms of specific outcomes—were carefully observed. When 
the chosen course of action failed to accomplish the desired 
outcome, usually it was modified or abandoned. Policies 
that were deemed successful were frequently replicated 
in other settings. This almost ‘pharmacological’—observe, 
experiment, implement—approach to policy-making was 
heavily dependent on a strong two-way flow of information 
between firms and the government, and a high degree of 
pragmatism on the part of the policy makers concerned. 
Africa faces a major constraint to experimentation—the 
donors. Where aid contributes significantly to national 
budgets, donors exercise an outsized level of influence 
on public policy. In the area of industrial policy donor-
sponsored efforts to improve the ‘investment climate’ 
have had little impact on the growth of Africa’s industrial 
sector, largely because the industrial development agenda 
has been imposed from outside, not defined through 
coordination between government and business. Indeed, 
in some cases, such as the IMF-World Bank sponsored 
Presidential Investors Advisory Councils, donors have 
captured local coordination mechanisms to advance their 
own policy agenda. 
Feedback 
Feedback was an essential element of the Asian industrial 
policy process and an important means of building 
accountability. Partly this was done by measurement of 
observable outcomes, for example the rate of growth 
of jobs or exports. Partly it depended on information 
gleaned from the private sector. In China, for example, local 
governments (prefectures, counties, townships, and villages) 
are directly connected to industrial clusters. By focusing on 
individual clusters and communicating frequently with local 
entrepreneurs, local governments were able to devise policies 
targeting specific constraints to industrial development. A 
top priority of Vietnam’s Prime Minister’s Reform Committee 
(PMRC) in the late 1990s and early 2000s was to observe the 
economy and society closely through daily interactions with 
institutions, businesses, and practitioners.
A major benefit of feedback is that it fosters institutional 
learning. Those countries that have been successful have 
learned how to conduct industrial policy as they have gone 
along. In Ethiopia for example, the government institutions 
responsible for the flower sector developed mechanisms to 
monitor the performance of interventions and adapted them 
to changing circumstances. By way of contrast, when the 
same government attempted to promote the basic metals and 
engineering industries no systematic feedback mechanism 
was developed and the sector stagnated.
To promote industrial development 
African governments must make efforts 
to engage the private sector
Effective implementation of the public 
actions derived from the state–business 
dialogue requires effective coordination 
in government
Industrial development requires 
learning how to successfully conduct 
industrial policy using trial and error 
and effective feedback
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This Policy Brief emanates from the UNU-WIDER project 
‘Jobs, poverty and structural change in Africa’, and 
accompanies the book ‘The Practice of Industrial Policy: 
Government–Business Coordination in Africa and East Asia’, 
edited by John Page and Finn Tarp, 
published by Oxford University Press, 2017.
Photo: Philip Schuler / World Bank
This peer-reviewed research is available free of charge. 
UNU-WIDER believes that research is a global public 
good and supports Open Access.
